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1. Introduction
In 1976 nuclear power accounted for 9% of electricity generated in
the United States. The technical and economic potential of this techno-
logy have in general been realized, although significant improvements are
technically feasible. In spite of this, the domestic nuclear industry
may grind to a halt.
We are studying this paradoxical state of affairs from both institu-
tional and technological perspectives, paying careful attention to the
interplay between the two. We have examined the attitudes and actions of
many sectors - electric utilities, vendors, federal agencies, state
agencies, architect-engineers, financial underwriters, public participa-
tion groups - all as much as possible from their own perspectives. Our
approach is to combine acquisition and analysis of information on the is-
sues as perceived by the various "players" with technical and economic
analysis of the costs and benefits of changes to the technology and to
the institutional and regulatory regime which influences its deployment.
Our analysis of the interest and perceptions of these various groups
indicates not only that the public decision-making organizations have
been unprepared to handle the breadth of issues involved and hence have
been caught by surprise, but they also seem to persist in that state, not
by stagnation, but by continually lagging. Surprising new developments
will arise, as will new problems, until eventually one or more of the
following alternatives occurs:
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The pace of LWR orders and installations will slow down
so much that the nuclear industry as presently consti-
tuted (or even modified) will be unable to survive, thus
ending the U.S. participation in the nuclear power field
pro tem; or
The Federal and State Governments will decide that in-
creased nuclear power is in the public interest and will
make effective opposition and intervention more diffi-
cult; or
The problems of public acceptance of nuclear power,
being largely generational, will gradually evaporate,
provided, of course, that the above alternatives do not
intervene.
Whatever the ultimate outcome, our analysis to date suggests the
following conclusions.
1. 'Institutional and technical aspects of the role of
nuclear power cannot be fully separated.
2. The most pronounced problems are (mainly) institu-
tional and social, and failure to solve them will be
sufficient to eliminate the nuclear option.
3. We see substantial economic and social benefits from
improvements in both technical and institutional aspects
of nuclear power.
4. Many feedback paths exist where difficulties foster
responses, which in turn reinforce the difficulties.
5. ERDA, or other Federal agencies, need to deal with a
substantively broader range of societal and institu-
tional issues than has hitherto been the custom; we have
several suggestions, both general and specific.
6. Excessive uncertainty - in regard to policies, sup-
ply, standards, cost, future acceptability - has had a
very corrosive effect on the LWR sector. (Irrational
irresolution must here be distinguished from keeping ra-
tional options open.)
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7. A substantial number of relatively non-disputable
technical improvements can be made right now, but to fix
on those as surrogates of the real problems would exa-
cerbate institutional difficulties
In the remainder of this report we discuss the basis for these con-
clusions. The reader should note that the participants in the study all
believe that nuclear electric power, if properly implemented, can contri-
bute substantially to meeting U.S. and world energy needs. Our purpose
in this study is not, however, to build a case for nuclear power. Rather
we seek to improve understanding of the present circumstances influencing
the development and deployment of this technology, and to analyze dif-
fering perspectives and the likely consequences of particular actions.
We attempt neither to present our own social viewpoint, nor to judge the
viewpoints expressed by others. As a result some readers may find in
this study reasons to strengthen the LWR sector; others may find reasons
to abandon it.
2. Institutional and Social Aspects
2.1 Summary of Approach
We have followed three general approaches in our analysis. The
first approach involved interviewing nearly 60 organizations concerned
with nuclear power,including 12 electric utility companies (public and
private), 12 public interest groups, 12 state regulatory agencies, seve-
ral vendors, architect-engineers, financial firms, and branches of the
Federal Government (including the Congress (1)). In all these personal
interviews, most of which were done by telephone, the basic format was as
uniform as possible, viz.
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1) Whlat are the problems with the LWR program, if any?
2) What agencies or sectors should be addressing the
problems mentioned in 1)? Do they have the proper in-
centives and means to do so?
3) How do you see the role of your organization in ad-
dressing those problems?
4) What is the process by which your organization
reaches decisions with regard to your involvement in the
LWR program, and which are the most important factors
which determine those decisions? (When addressed to
utilities this question meant decisions to build LWRs
instead of coal plants, or perhaps nothing. When ad-
dressed to the public interest groups it meant the deci-
sion to intervene in the license process, etc.)
5) Is there proper balance between nuclear power and
alternative energy sources with regard to public accep-
tance, regulation, promotion, R&D, information about
safety and environmental impacts?
Variations and elaborations were designed for each group, and topics that
each group thought especially important were explored. Typical interview
times were one to two hours.
The second approach (see (2)) involved questionnaires, sent princi-
pally to selected electric utility companies and regulatory agencies, de-
signed to elicit information on the effect of regulatory procedures - on
planning, construction schedules, costs, and productivity. The results
of this survey (now being analyzed) will be combined with results from a
parallel study we are presently (August 1977) carrying out in Europe in
hopes of making some insightful comparisons.
The third approach has been focused on preparation of topical es-
says, each dealing with a facet of the problem we thought important ab
initio (see (1)). Examples are: how balance can be upset between pro-
motional and regulatory forces, the role of public information, and the
(in)adequacies of existing institutions to deal with LWR issues.
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In this synopsis, the three approaches have been integrated as much
as possible so as to highlight several over-riding topics which have
emerged to date. Many topics of interest but lesser importance are here
mentioned hardly more than by their titles. (See (1) for more details.)
2.2 The Role of Uncertaint
Although each sector perceived this problem far differently, almost
all gave it high priority. For example, the electric utility industry
has traditionally operated in an atmosphere in which the technical chal-
lenges were substantial but not overwhelming, and where regulation per-
mitted them to exchange the chance of high profits and the risk of finan-
cial failure for a relatively guaranteed but moderate rate of return on
investment. Their time perspective was long, because of owning and ope-
rating equipment with expected lifetimes of about 40 years. For a long
period preceding the 1970's utilities grew accustomed to decreasing real
costs of both fuel and capital equipment (mainly through increases in
size and generating efficiency). Because electric energy rates were
generally set on the basis of past performance, the companies could
usually take advantage of improving circumstances between rate reviews.
Additionally, electric power plants were small enough in size and number
so that siting was a tractable problem. Fuel supply was simpler; to be
sure, the price ten years hence might not have been predictable, but the
supply was predictable, and therefore some price explainable to rate com-
missions surely existed. Environmental degradation had not emerged as a
large issue, and alternative low-energy lifestyles had not been discovered
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All that has changed; the electric utility companies see the fol-
lowing problems being posed within the electric utility sector, but they
cannot be solved within it:
A time limit on resources may now exist which falls within the
time limit of new plant obsolescence.
The utilities must change their technological base for power
generation within one technological obsolescence time (on which
there is more below)
Environmental constraints restricting and delaying siting of
new plants and requiring new control equipment.
In the LWR area especially, what seems like the possibility of
endless backfits, and bad estimates of their cost.
Perception by the utilities that governmental attitudes are il-
logical, uncertain, and unpredictable with respect to nuclear
power. An example of this is what to do with spent fuel; are
the electric utilities liable to be stuck with it?
The virtual guarantee that various groups will intervene, much
more so for nuclear plants than for other types.
More problems of this non-internalizable sort could be listed. One
that may soon arise is a court finding that the Price-Anderson Act is un-
constitutional (in limiting the right to sue, not in the matter of go-
vernment guarantees). Then electric. utility companies, without an ade-
quate national consortium arrangement or a government guarantee of sup-
port, will feel themselves unable to answer demands for fiscal responsi-
bility at the levels demanded by critics.
The electric utility sector's rewards are not based on building nu-
clear reactors, but in large part on providing reliable service at low
cost. Escalation of uncertainty escalates doubts about future relia-
bility and future cost. Thus the electric utility sector finds reasons
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- at least in the short run - not to "think nuclear," but rather to opt
for solutions defensible at state levels in the short term: these in-
clude installing oil-coal convertible plants, burning oil today and re-
cording for future defense the Federal government's optimistic remarks a-
bout future coal acceptability and availability. Alternatively, the
electric utility company may install nothing, waiting until public demand
forces them to install turbines on a short lead time. Clearly, this
strategy does not deal with long-term problems; it ignores them. Thus,
we find that quite apart from questions of long-term economy, long-range
logic, international security, etc., the electric utilities have strong
incentives to avoid the LWR business.
The effects o excessive uncertainty become obvious in the actions
of vendors. Besides facing certain of the problems described above, they
see reduced incentives to make long-term investments in what may be a dy-
ing industry. To the best of our knowledge, none of the principal ven-
dors has more than 10% of its business in nuclear reactors and most could
as easily make fossil fuel components for electric power plants.
At the other extreme, this uncertainty causes rejoicing. Some
groups opposed to nuclear power (see below for some misunderstood rea-
sons) accurately see the proliferation of uncertainty and distrust as
helpful to the cause. Far from having any interest in resolving these
matters, they actively promote dissension and non-resolution, to further
weaken nuclear power as an energy option.
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At a peculiar intermediate level, we find the architect-engineering
sector whose rewards depend on resolving uncertainty and complexity in
the long term, even though in the short term they stand to lose finan-
cially if certain standardized designs are adopted.
2.3 Reinforcing Feedback Loops
Many exist which can operate either to reinforce the dominance of a
particular technology or to ruin it. The reinforcement of dominance is
easy to see: the LWR sector so dominates the nuclear industry that any
alternative design (e.g., an advanced CANDU) is given little possibility
of success in the U.S. because it could not penetrate the market in time
and no U.S. commercial support exists for it. The dominance of the LMFBR
over other breeder concepts is a well-known example of how certain pro-
grams develop momenta of their own.
Some less obvious reinforcement loops operate the other way to ruin
the industry. If the electric utility sector and the manufacturers think
that ERDA will develop the technology for new energy options, then the
non-ERDA sector sees little benefit in doing much. That attitude leads
to less attention and less competence by both the electric utilities and
the manufacturers, thus increasingly justifying ERDA's role.
2.4 Imbalances
There are many. We choose three, and leave several others - like
the'imbalance of information regarding different energy options and its
effect on perceptions and choices, to appear inferentially in this synop-
sis.
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2.4.1 The problem and the participants -- The LWR problem involves
the technological R&D sectors, manufacturers, electric utilities, regula-
tory agencies, environmntalists, public interest groups, and financial
sectors. In 1970, however, the Federal Government not only denied that
several of these groups had any constructive role to play, but through
its internal actions also denied that societal issues had any substantial
place in the debate.
Now even that statement would be no more than anecdotal history,
were it not for the fact that many vital interests in the energy debate
are still not included.As just one example, consider cities. A majority
of the U.S. population lives in urban areas. Both the highest population
density and (in general) the highest energy consumption per unit area oc-
cur there. Since the impact of energy use - hence of exercising energy
options - per person increases monotonically with energy use per unit
area, we see that the major societal impact of energy otpions on people
comes via urban effects. These problems manifest themselves in many
ways: commuters and urban expressways encouraged by a policy of cheap
fuels; general air pollution and smog as a result of energy-environmental
trade-offs; large urban buildings with glass curtain walls; urban designs
that require air conditioners leaving those without them in even worse
condition. So enters urban anomie, the lack of effective urban plan-
ning. This problem, now just appearing in full dress, has been evident
as just described for years, but still no adequate attention is paid.
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By title, we mention more: (i) the connection (or lack thereof) be-
tween civilian nuclear power and international weapons proliferation;
currently that is a fashionable topic, and yet no one seeks out the real
views of LDCs. (ii) energy conservation may be a matter of technical
fixes or changes in attitude, but only recently have we begun to study
seriously any of the low-energy use scenarios that have been proposed du-
ring the past several years. (iii) everyone talks about supposed health
effects of energy, but why are the epidemiologists and public health sec-
tors brought in so peripherally?
2.4.2 Different time perspectives -- The non-matching of time pers-
pectives, and especially the lack of attention in this matter has led to
much confusion, especially in regards to the proper role to be played by
various sectors.
The business sector, figuring money can be obtained at 15% per year,
has a six or seven year time horizon for recovering investments. The po-
litical sector generally has comparable or, more likely, shorter time ho-
rizons. Yet the time to develop major new technological options is typi-
cally 25 years (controlled fusion has been at it that long, and will take
25 more), and the time for depleting important resources has now shrunk
to a similar period. The distinctly different character of these times
leads to decisions that are perfectly justifiable in the short term and
make no sense in the longer term: redouble the effort to find more na-
tural gas and domestic oil, but pay relatively little attention to how a
civilization will be able to switch from those sources in a very short
time. On a longer time scale, the worldwide CO2 levels are building up
toward consequential levels early in the next century, and yet we stimu-
late conversion to coal.
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Policies ot short-term fixes and long-term consequences are not new,
and can be seen through all of history. Consider for example, the Greeks
and Romans who cut down their trees for firewood, then put goats on the
land, thus turning much of the Mediterranean littoral from woods to the
rocky landscape it has been for nearly 2,000 years.
2.4.3 Regulation and Promotion -- Is the present system stable? Is
it inherently incapable of resolving these issues about LWRs? Almost all
of our interviewees felt that the present regulatory system was not
working well, although different and sometimes opposing reasons were gi-
ven.
Rather than dwell on anecdotal details, we raise here the question
of whether separation of function is really possible. A presumed inter-
nal conflict of interest over dual roles of promotion and regulation was
the apparent cause of the AEC's demise and transformation. But what was
accomplished? One can imagine the situation where each part, not needing
any more to concern itself with the other, feels itself unshackled, so to
speak, and free to pursue a pure course. Thus, while promotion and re-
gulation become legally separated, the balance is also unstable, for as
one side starts winning over the other, the putative loser has to yield
more ground to preserve control over its most basic social objectives, to
"look good" to public and Governmental sectors. One side captures the
other, even though neither planned it that way.
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Even if the finest balance persists, the separation guarantees that
some major issues will not be resolved at the working level. Thus, in
true Hegelian logic, the promotional thesis and regulatory antithesis
must seek a synthesis -- i.e., a resolution -- at a higher administrative
level. But now, at this higher level, the debate starts all over again
-- promotion and regulation under the same roof. Sometimes the larger
area is more appropriate, but the logical extension of this dilemma up-
ward often overloads administrators at inappropriately high levels, who
then, in desperation, must decide arbitrarily or assign the power of dic-
tatorial decision to some inadequately prepared executive assistant.
Our form of government will not make it easy to resolve this problem
(or a number of others). The impediment arises because the Federal go-
vernment was purposely designed so that too much decision-making power
could not be concentrated in one place. The founders' reaction to ex-
cesses of England's George III serves the country well in many ways, but
it also permits indecision to cycle round and round. One particular man-
ifestation of this in the LWR sector is long procedures that reach higher
and higher into the administration, all of which can be overturned by
court actions. The possibility or actuality of later court action modi-
fies present decisions at the administrative level, but these modifica-
tions often do not prevent later challenges.
The weak Federal system depends for its proper functioning upon a
citizenry that is well-intormed about the fundamentals of the problem, as
noted by Jefferson. Thus arises the need for broad dissemination of in-
formation, and the public perception and acceptance of it as well-inten-
tioned and valid.
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By this single example, we see how far afield a seemingly straight-
forward question has led us, and how far we (and ERDA) must reach for a
suitably encompassing answer.
2.5 Nuclear Power as a Lfestyle Symbol
Any who doubt that this is a major issue should read A. Lovins' Soft
EnergyPaths (5). Nuclear power is seen as technology, and is opposed
not just for itself, but for what is perceived to come in its train. We
do not presume in this synopsis to attempt to debate nuclear versus
non-nuclear futures, "high technology" versus "low technology," except to
note that many public interest sectors claim that these broader questions
are the real ones and that no one listens. One can make a generalization
here: there are too few listeners on all sides and too many are prepared
to talk right past others with different viewpoints. Our interviews with
various groups were marked by the lack of concern - either spontaneous or
stimulated - that any group showed toward the deeply felt view of any
other group. Exceptions exist, of course, but the lack of charity was
clear.
2.6 Who Is Minding the Store?-
At present, no one. Both the White House and the Congress have been
timid, as if more concerned with short-term popularity than long-term be-
nefit. ERDA itself has interpreted its charter very narrowly; for a con-
firmatory example outside the scope of this report, see the assessments
done bythe Congressional Office ot Technology Assessment of the ERDA
budget and program plans in 19/5. Some of those apparent timidities have
been overcome e.g., a much stronger interest in conservation and inter-
national issues), yet many more remain.
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3. Technical and Economics Issues
3.1 Summary of Approach
The institutional and regulatory regime within which LWRs are de-
ployed strongly influences both decisions to choose this technology and
the technical characteristics and productivity of the technology. In
this section we present information on the possibilities for improving
LWR technology efficiency, and on the economic implications of these im-
provements for the electric power industry and electricity consumers.
Our approach has been to analyze in detail the current condition of the
technology in terms of factors determining capacity utilization, capital
and other fixed costs, and variable costs, especially fuel cycle costs.
Technical possibilities for improving these factors are then evaluated,
and the expected changes in technology efficiency are estimated. These
changes may be summarized in terms of changes in the busbar cost of
electricity derived from nuclear power (see (3)).
However, changes in cost per unit of electricity delivered from nu-
clear will have second-order effects. upon capacity expansion and pro-
duction decisions of utilities through changes in relative costs and up-
on consumption decisions of consumers, through changes in the price of
electricity. To measure the benefits of an improvement in nuclear tech-
nology requires us to measure these second-order effects.
To do this we make use of the MIT Regional Electricity Model (REM)
developed by Martin Baughman and Paul Joskow (see (6, 7)). REM is an
economic/engineering model representation characterizing the expansion
and production decisions of utilities, and the consumption decisions of
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consumers. It provides an econometric submodel for determining the de-
mand for electricity and competing fuels, for regional transmission and
distribution, and for regulatory controlled pricing. The model can be
checked with present data and conditions, and is used here to estimate
the present value of possible future changes in LWR capital cost, in nu-
clear fuel fabrication cost, in LWR capacity factors, and in real fuel
costs.
3.2 Targets of Opportunity
3.2.1. Increase Capacity Factor -- The value of improvements
in the LWR capacity factor is substantial. In Table I, we summarize in-
formation on electric power expansion, production, prices, and fuel con-
sumption under three assumptions about the capacity factors for nuclear
power plants coming on line in 1990 (see (3) for further discussion).
The most interesting scenario (column 4) involves an increase in the ca-
pacity factor from .64 to .75 for plants coming on line in 1990. By
1995, the effect of this improvement in efficiency is to increase total
generation 5.4% over the base case with nuclear's share in generation ri-
sing to 52% of the total (up from 41% in the base case). Further, there
is a savings in petroleum used in electric power generation of approxi-
mately .54 million barrels per day (MMBD). The total petroleum savings
after accounting for substitution of electricity for direct use of petro-
leum is .86 DI BD.
The benefits from separate improvements would add less than linearly
if, when the power plant shuts down for maintenance and/or repair, up-
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coining problems were recognized and repaired ahead of time. Most opera-
tions and repairs that can be scheduled during the regular refueling pe-
riod do not affect the capacity factor, although they may affect other
decisions about nuclear power quite profoundly. Better planned mainte-
nance and pre-outage scheduling (planned outage and contingency schedu-
ling) could save significant outage time.
With some uncertainty arising from these and other factors, we have
analyzed NRC, EPRI, and other data, interviewed several electric utility
companies and vendors, and arrive at the following list of items in order
of priority. Tle expected annual dollar savings are based on the as-
sumption of a 1000MWe capacity plant and $250,000/plant-day replacement
power cost.*
(i) Refueling time -- If the present average refueling time could
be brought down from an average of about 49 days to 30 days, the expected
annual saving would be nearly $5.3 million/plant year. Such an improve-
ment could only arise through a number of coordinated activities: in-
creased standardization (hence better-optimized spare parts inventories,
more experience with specific items etc.), better identification of key
jobs and scheduling thereof, development of new control and monitoring
systems, and so forth. We note that additional identical units at the
same stations have had significantly better capacity factors.
Perhaps the most important matter is to understand all that is ac-
complished during refueling outages and which jobs have controlled the
length of them. We are carrying on a limited study of the detailed pos-
sibilities, as part of this contract.
*Estimates of replacement power costs depend upon costs of replacement
capacity which may vary substantially. Our estimate seems reasonable, if
not slightly low.
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(ii) Fuel -- This is not refueling, but the fuel itself and the
fuel cycle. Total benefits of about $4.9 million/plant year seem pos-
sible. For example, about $.5 million/year benefit would accrue if the
modern reactor fuel (zircaloy clad) could be cycled as rapidly as could
the old-style stainless steel fuel; then nuclear power plants come to
full power more quickly. Further in the future they could load-follow to
a considerable extent, so that more benefits might accrue from not having
to operate fossil plants.
(iii) Turbines -- Savings of $2.3 million/plant year are possible
here, mainly in improving reliability of large turbines. We have not
studied this area in great detail, but note that while turbine designs
have been stable for many years, new monitoring systems may offer advance
warning of developing problems. The possibility of repair before failure
could save significant outage time.
(iv) Steam generators and condensers -- Perhaps $2.1 million/plant
year is available here by improvement of a few percent in plant capacity
factor; the benefits come about equally from improvements in each class
of device.
This topic allows us to show by example how we think about such mat-
ters. Figure I shows a preliminary decision tree for condensers. We
have similar ones for turbines, steam generators, etc., which help us to
find both critical path items and items for which R&D is liable to pay
off. The refinement and analysis of these decision trees is an important
part of our continuing work.
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(v) Pumps and valves -- flere, as much as $4.1 million/plant year
might be capturable, via a detailed set of improvements, both in the
equipment itself and its maintenance. Except for reactor coolant pumps
which have experienced a significant number of similar failures, these
problems are distributed over a great variety of components operated un-
der many different environments. Design practices - redundancies and
standardization 
- and improved maintenance practices seem the best paths
available overall.
3.2.2 Reduce Capital Costs -- Several possibilities exist,
but as usual a number of impediments exist also. The effects are indeed
significant. In Table I we find that lowering LWR capital costs from
$490/KW to $430/KW (1976 $) beginning in 1980 has a significant effect
upon the role of nuclear in total generation, as well as upon price and
consequently the total generation. Because of the 10-year lead time in
constructing LWR plants, the effect is not apparent until 1990, except
for minor changes due to interest charges on construction and lower coal
capacity expansion in anticipation of increased nuclear capacity. By
1995, however, nuclear power accounts for 35% of capacity (up from 31% in
the base case) and provides over 46% of electricity (up from 41% in the
base case).
Another way to interpret the effect of a change in technology costs
and efficiencies is in terms of the discounted present value of the be-
nefits to the energy system, or in terms of the savings in a scarce fuel,
such as petroleum, which is thought to be priced below its social value.
For example, reducing LWR capital costs from $490/KWh to $430 KWh in 1980
reduces the total cost of delivered energy in the U.S. by $3.1 billion
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measured in terms.of the discounted value of decreases in the total cost
of energy (assume 6% discount rate , horizon 1977-1997). Such a decrease
in LWR capital costs might be attained through plant standardization. We
may interpret this number as meaning that we should be willing to pay up
to this amount to obtain this benefit. Of course, the same benefit might
be obtained by other investments to improve LWR technology or other
energy technologies.
We now explore some technical possibilities for reducing LWR capital
costs.
(i) Standardization -- Standardization of power plant design and
equipment can be accomplished by the floatation, duplication or replica-
tion concepts. Or it can be accomplished on a partial basis by using an
NSSS reference system design, a standard electric plant or turbine gene-
rator plant design, or standardized major pieces of equipment. The CON-
CEPT 4 computer code for estimating costs of specified reactor configura-
tions has been used to determine cost sensitivity to standardization.
We find that,
Greater cost reduction results from time-related factors rather
than from hardware
A 10% reduction in nuclear lead time contributes 7% savings in
direct costs.
a 10% reduction in man hours/KWe contributes 3.5% savings in
direct costs.
A 10% reduction in equipment costs contributes 3.3% savings in
direct costs (thus indirectly supporting the legend that to
scale from component cost to plant cost, multiply by r).
A 10% reduction in equipment escalation rate contributes 1.15%
savings in direct costs.
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Savings in direct costs are linearly proportional to the re-
duction for each contributor.
Total savings in direct costs through standardization are
around 10-12.5%, resulting in a reduction of capital costs from
$490/KW to $430/KW in 1980 (1976 $)
Savings on interest and escalation due to shorter construction
time are less than proportional to the reduction in con-
struction time.
A number of difficulties in achieving more standardization need men-
tioning. The benefits are significant but not overwhelming, and come in
the long term and via sustained efforts by vendors, utilities, regulatory
agencies, and ERDA. Present attitudes toward LWRs do not clearly warrant
any one manufacturer making large investments, expecting payback within
conventional economic time horizonons (5-7 years, say). Furthermore, it
is not clear how much any plant can be "standardized," or whether such
plants will be accepted without further serious court challenges. For
example, siting a nuclear electric power plant involves specific and
non-specific features. The boundary between the two is fuzzy. Does one
handle nuclear reactors near airports, near geologic fault zones, etc.,
the same as all others, thus escalating the cost of all?
(ii) Shortened construction time. Several suggestions are commonly
heard, which fall into two general classes.
(a) Siting policy. Can the U.S., like France, for example, choose
in advance sites potentially suitable or non-suitable for
electric power plants, thus removing from the electric utility
companies both some degree of freedom and also some corrosive
uncertainties. In principle, and in scientific environmental
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terms, much could be done, but even here some regulatory changes
would be required, because sites and plants are considered together
in the present licensing procedures.
(b) Change the regulatory constraints, approvals and challenge pro-
cedures with respect to construction. It is both impossible
and undesirable to try to return to the pre-Calvert Cliffs
(i.e., pre-1970) era; but since then, the net result of the in-
clusion of the environmental review and of increasing the com-
plexity of the safety review has been a 49-month increase in
the average time to completion of power station construction.
Of greater concern to a utility than the increase in the
average construction and licensing time is the possibility that
a particular plant could take much longer than the mean time
for complete construction and licensing. Several unfortunate
case histories of this sort are available (with additional
delays as great as 30 months), and a few more appear to be
developing currently. Significant costs accrue to the utility
- and ultimately the public - as such delays occur, and this,
coupled with unforeseen delays in the past and the continuing
prospect for such delays in the future, leads utilities to
adopt special caution in their approach to ordering new nuclear
plants.
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The dollar cost of delay is not nearly so large as interest and es-
calation calculated for the whole plant over the whole delay period.
First, if the delay occurs at the beginning when not much money is com-
mitted, delay is cheap, provided that it does not lead to an expensive
shortage later. Second, some have claimed that the time-pattern of ex-
penditures will be changed by the delay, usually toward a more intensive
and shorter period, but our data tend not to support this notion. Third,
many vendors offer no-cost (or cheap) contract extensions, because they
don't want to lose the business. This latter favor granted the electric
utility companies depends on prevailing economic conditions, and may not
persist. Our studies to discover the true costs of these delays are
still under way.
It is instructive to note that in other countries (notably France)
with more centralized government, much of the cost of possible delays is
avoided by performing most licensing functions prior to the decision to
build a particular type of power station on a particular site. That is
to say, in such cases site-specific 'issues are reviewed and environmental
protection rulings are made before a site is chosen for specific power
station use. Similarly, generic nuclear safety questions are resolved
before deciding to match a specific type of plant to a particular site.
Finally, site-specific safety issues are resolved prior to the utility's
commitment to construct a plant at the site in question. Only after re-
solution of all substantial regulatory questions is the decision made to
commit funds to plant construction; and at that point further review of
previous regulatory decisions, either by the agencies or courts, is made
very difficult. Dealing with such issues means dealing with the struc-
ture of government itself, as we remarked earlier.
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(iii) Improved project management and financing -- Improved pro-
ject management could save on labor requirements, material consumption
and construction time while new financing practices could increase the
availability of capital to allow selection of plant types to minimize the
levelized cost of electricity. However, there is much more to it.
Consider the motivation of the relevant sectors. The electric uti-
lities are not motivated very well by the present institutions and reward
systems. That is, if the electric utility makes an improvement, they may
have to pay a penalty to get approved. Electric utilities do not bear
the cost of continuation of the status quo, and wrong decisions are often
perpetuated. Historically, utilities let vendors and architect-engineers
do the R&D. Vendors have relatively little incentive either, and most
A-E's would lose in the short run by such strategems as plant standardi-
zation.
A possible restructuring of electric utility, vendor, and national
Laboratory R,D&b with a different basis for Federal and private funding
is being studied, to see if incentives can be offered for improvement in
all the sectors simultaneously. Our present ideas run along the fol-
lowing general lines:
(a) Electric utilities, which presently spend less than 0.5% of
their gross income of R,D&D, be required by law to contribute a lar-
ger fraction to a consortium effort (larger than present or planned
(EPRI)). Electric utilities will be stimulated thereby to look more
seriously into their future. These utility increases can be passed
through to users (with certain safeguards against losing incentives
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to be efficient). The consortium also makes commitments on behalf
of all the electric utility companies of sufficient pooled resources
to handle the consequences of serious accidents. Thus the
Price-Anderson problem becomes defused.
(b) ERDA and other federal groups continue to supply substantial
funds for R,D&D, but not exercise such full control over what the
options will be.
(c) The new consortium should have "drawing rights" on the national
laboratories. Thus the national labs, industry, and the utilities
are naturally motivated to interact, which needed to be done for lo!
these many years. Also, the electric utilities will realize (1)
they can get help; (2) they must help themselves; and (3) the fu-
ture they contemplate is their own. Almost the same can be said for
the national labs.
The role of architect-engineer poses delicate difficulties. They
are the principal entrepreneurs in the nuclear power sector (and in con-
struction of many types of industrial plants), and therefore by con-
ventional thinking, are essential to the industry. But some large elec-
tric utility companies do their own A-E work, and claim significantly
lower plant costs as a result. In addition, the A-E sectors tend to
thrive on resolving complex problems, and plans to streamline the nuclear
industry via either new manufacturing or new regulatory arrangements
would threaten to reduce their role. Thus some of them may not be ex-
pected to be enthusiastic about change.
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3.2.3 Fuel Cycle Costs -- A number of important issues
regarding the fuel cycle have been identified and are under
investigation. These include:
Institutional problems currently dominate the fuel cycle, pre-
venting application of available technology, and making neces-
sary non-commercial incentives for new technology.
Analysis of cost uncertainties related to fuel technology in-
dicates areas needing attention are U30 8 supply and fuel
disposal.
Fuel technology is related to reactor performance (i.e., ca-
pacity factor) in two important ways: (a) fuel limitations
reduce capacity factor, as described above, and (b)
over-optimistic estimates of CF coupled with fixed refueling
dates or fuel failure wastes ore in permanent once-through
cycles.
Prospects for development of new or improved fuel cycle techno-
logy are waning due to weakened economic base, and government
pre-emption of both the back-end and enrichment. This should
not necessarily be interpreted as critical of government in-
volvement; it is mere recognition of a fact.
Sustainability of the policy of no used fuel reprocessing needs
re-examination. (a) Can it be supported in the face of contrary
policies in other countries? (b) Is new technology needed for
whole-assembly disposal? (c) Will Pu recycle be re-examined
if an ore shortage develops?
4. Planned Continuation and Important Future Topics
4.1 Things for ERDA to Be Cncerned about
From our studies, we see substantial benefits in ERDA's being con-
cerned in a number of areas, and substantial costs (perhaps extinction of
the LWR option) if ERDA or some equivalent Federal organization is not
concerned. These are evident from our report. The principal ones are:
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Resolve the back-end of the LWR fuel cycle and probably the
front end too, not only in terms of technology, but in terms of
whether public or private ownership make better sense.
Study questions related to factory-built reactors, and stan-
dardization, including appropriate incentives, economic and
operating problems, siting, and public acceptance. Formulate
and work to implement policies to achieve increased standardi-
zation.
Study the possibility (and limitations) of separating power
plant siting from the licensing of specific plants designs.
Formulate and recommend strategies to establish new institu-
tional arrangements to connect electric utility companies, man-
ufacturers, the government and the general public in ways like-
ly to lead to better or less expensive energy options.
Determine what whould be the logical degree of separation be-
tween stimulation and promotion and what organizational ar-
rangements are most likely to achieve that condition.
Explore the possibility of planning that starts with societal
goals'and leads toward technical and economic options, rather
than planning that starts with technical and economic options
and calculates the societal impacts. In other words, find out
how to think about alternative lifestyles.
Explore modes by which the government sectors at federal,
state, and local levels can interact with the public on public
issues, in meaningful ways.
4.2 Activities Planned under Our Present Contract
These include:
Further analysis of interviews and development of topical es-
says on imbalance of information, participants in the debate
misunderstanding each other's motives and messages, need for
upgrading the awareness and extending the time perspectives of
the electric utility and other sectors, stability of the elec-
tric utility-regulatory-publ].ic interaction, etc.
Further analysis of the history, patterns, and costs of regula-
tory changes during the past several years, and comparison with
the situation in other countries.
Determination of more detailed costs and benefits of making
particular technological changes to reactors, fuel, fuel hand-
ling procedures, and balance of plant.
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Further conceptual development of new institutional arrange-
ments, designed to permit better electric utility and public
particpation in option development, which could lead to better
balance among sectors in funding R&D, and deciding on new op-
tions.
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